I am a PhD Candidate at Johns Hopkins University interested in health care economics and applied econometrics. My research examines policy-relevant questions related to competition, consolidation, and vertical integration in health care markets. In prior and ongoing research, I have studied how acquisitions of physician practices by private equity funds change physician practice patterns, including strategic referral behavior, and the downstream effects on patient welfare and the clinical workforce.
My research has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as Health Affairs, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) Network, and Health Services Research, and featured in mainstream media outlets such as Vox, Bloomberg Business, Fortune Magazine, Kaiser Health News, and Politico. My teaching experience includes a diverse set of courses in health economics, health care finance, and the business of health to MBA, MPH, and Ph.D. students for which I received a teaching award in 2021.
Before graduate school, I worked as a senior analyst in the antitrust and competition practice of National Economic Research Associates (NERA) in New York. I hold a graduate degree in international finance and economic policy from Columbia University and a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and economics from Bryn Mawr College.
PhD in Health Economics and Policy (Expected 2023)
Johns Hopkins University
MPA in International Finance and Economic Policy
BA in Mathematics, Economics
Bryn Mawr College
Multispecialty physician practices (MSP) incentivize referrals from generalists to be made to specialists within the practice. With growing acquisitions of MSP by private equity funds (PE), there is concern that high-powered for-profit incentives of PE may accelerate misalignments in patient-physician relationships to increase self-referrals with unknown implications for patient welfare. Using novel data on PE acquisitions linked to Medicare claims data, I advance the literature on PE and vertical integration in health care markets by studying the precise ways that acquisitions of MSP by PE change strategic referral behavior. I base my empirical analysis on 230 acquisitions of MSP over a 4-year period. Using a discrete choice model, I find that PE acquisitions increase self-referrals by 7 percent. I then consider the channels through which acquisitions produce such large changes in self referrals, finding that increased market power or endogenous acquisition selection cannot explain increases in self-referrals. Rather, my main results are driven by the adoption of PE’s managerial strategies. Finally, I consider the welfare implications for patients and payers. Self-referrals can reduce welfare if they foreclose competing specialists from accessing patient referrals; on the other hand, self-referrals can improve welfare if they facilitate care coordination between generalists and specialists. I find both forces to be present. Taken together, this paper contributes policy-relevant evidence of the heterogeneous effects of vertical integration that depend on the managerial environment that shape provider incentives. As the United States continues to transition towards value-based care contracts that pay for clinical performance, corporate ownership in multispecialty settings may have the potential to balance profitability and patient welfare by leveraging managerial skills to improve clinical in addition to financial outcomes.
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Fall 2022, 2021, 2020
Fall 2021, 2020
Summer 2021, Fall 2020